My translation of Duzer's post Ut Universi et Singuli. Thomas was so kind to edit my translation and I am pleased with the end result. PDF version: Ut Universi et Singuli.
Ut Universi et Singuli
Thomas Duzer
“An ossuary has a hundred bones, a thousand bones, ten thousand bones [...] I'm in an ossuary, right, now what does that mean? Where does desire flow?”
Gilles Deleuze
“In the ossuary Sartre stole a skull that we carried away.”
Simone de Beauvoir
It is false to assert that nothingness – which is, let us recall, the actual non existence of something – identifies itself with non-Being. No, μὴ ὄν is not οὐκ ὄν; μὴ ὄν is in fact ἕτερον therefore not a pure nothing. The presence of an absence is not the absence of the presence as such, because the absence of the presence would in reality be the presence of a hypothetical absolute negation. Naturally, the negation can negate everything, except, once and for all, the same fact of that continuous negation. Thus this is a typical case of an infinite regress, a type of autophagous nihilism, or even of an autoimmune nature. So, postulating nothingness (thus the absence of a particular being) as identical to non-Being is postulating the contradiction in an ontological way, but in a performative manner. Consequently, this is eventually the postulation of Being, while refusing the λόγος and the νοῦς as such, and not simply one of their manifestations. Such an enterprise is in reality a parasitical, even a hysterical one, since, principally, it necessitates that what it denies. Ceteris paribus, a similar problem presents itself with that one might gladly call blimp's devout ramblings, those fantasies that postulate a unique necessary being. No, let us be resolutely Aristotelian: “saying that Being is and that Non-Being is not, that is the truth”.
In the same way that one should not confuse “nothingness” with “non-Being”, one must distinguish carefully Being from any being, that is to say, εἶναι from τὸ ὄν , esse from ens, and Sein from Seiende. A being (τὸ ὄν, ens or Seiende) is that what is, that which has Being. And that by what a being is, is Being (εἶναι, esse or Sein). Between these two instances resides a difference which has been called the ontological difference.
In fact, for a being to be, Being must have been given to this being. So, the appearance of a being must be conceived as its participation in the presence of Being, understood as: “there is”. Thus, a being is without contestation a present participle. But if Being is what makes the givenness of Being, this must be made according to a particular difference. Being which is given to a being is not indeed Being itself, for the simple reason that no being can give Being without having received it. Otherwise a being would be Being itself and thus could not be, because Being would not have been given to it. One sees the paradox rising: Being, thus, is not Being ? Yes, because for there to be a being there needs to be Being, but the sine qua non condition is that Being is not a being. Being, this ‘there is’ of any being, must thus be different in a way from any being. But how then think Being in itself? In effect, Being is neither a being, nor Being of a being. One could respond that what Being gives to a being is the difference with itself. It would still be necessary to add that it is also the givenness of the difference between Being and Being of a being. Again, if not, Being will be a being. But this difference would imply that it would not be the givenness of Being by Being, because Being would give its difference to itself, i.e. would give eventually what he has not. Heidegger offers his notorious «solution» of this paradox via Heraclitus: «Nothing is more dear to emergence than concealment». Being would thus give itself in its retreat. More than a solution, one sees it; it is a contradiction that the last Heidegger will idly try to battle. Rather, one may see a majestic Enigma, or, going as far as to sacrifice to the spirits of Derrida and believe that “originary” must be understood as having been crossed out. But one would have gone wrong, because, we affirm, the lack cannot be ontological.
Let us keep for a moment this ambiguous lexicon, and notice that the « givenness » of Being to a being cannot enter the classical relation between subject and object, or even between subject and predicate. That is a trap in language that forces us towards a paradox, this hidden root of the anthropomorphical god. And if it is not necessary here to recall the preeminent role of the Heidegger’s “shepherding of Being”, this clearing where we are lead over paths in the Black Forrest which often has however the allure of a Court of Miracles. No, the so-called “givenness” results from the Self which is the final point where identity and difference, activity and passivity coincide. The true cogito is, if not an acephalous cogito, at least a cogito without phrases, i.e. an intensive cogito, a cogitare of power. Yes, the domain of the possible is drawn by the effective deployment of power. Or, more abruptly: power is not limited by any a priori possibility. The illusions of language always return in effect to postulating itself as a condition even anterior to Being. Finally, here we see the return of the claim of the supremacy of the representation over that what it represents, even more so the mixing of two instances. O fantasies, o flatus vocis and hallucinations! But let us dispose of that: a pious logic is certainly piousness towards a chimera but in stricto sensu, it is no longer a logic.