Metaphysical Displacement

Cioran in conversation with Fernando Savater (1977):

I feel completely detached from any country, any group. I am a metaphysically displaced person, a little like the stoics at the end of the Roman Empire who felt like citizens of the world which is to say they felt like citizens of no part.

And later with Lea Vergine (1984):

I am legally displaced, and that works well with something profound, which is neither ideological or political. My metaphysical state. I wish to be of no part, without identity.

Discontinuous Thinking

Cioran in conversation with Leo Gillet (1982) about the aphorism:

The aphorisms are momentary instantiations of something general. They are a discontinuous thinking. You have a thought which explains everything, that is what calls a momentary instantiation of thought. It is a thought that does not include much truth, but that contains enough for it to arrive. It is in the experience of life that one can verify its meaning and contents.

And later with Fritz J. Raddatz in 1986:

I cannot express what they result to. My aphorisms are not real aphorisms; each one of them is the conclusion of a fit. The finale of a small epileptic crisis [...].

I let everything just fall down and I don’t offer a conclusion as in a tribunal, where there is not a final verdict: to be sentenced to death. Without the unfolding of a thought, what remains is simply what it results to. That is how I procede, that is my formula.

Visibility as an Ability

Visibility without visuality: the visual as the beam emanating from Beatrice’s eye in Dante’s Paradiso. It ‘shone more than a thousand miles’. The visual in this case is a reflection of divine light, bouncing of the soul through the eyes outwards to illuminate the gaze itself as it looks upon the world. The visual as standing on De Certeau’s World Trade Center looking down on the city with a beam of this divine reflected light leaving the eye which lights up the city revealing a phantom text, eerily transparant, but only from the strategic and concentrated perspective of a god.

Visibilty as an ability, a capacity for something to be shown. But now positively frustrated: the capacity to make visible remains but not visually. No beam of light, but more of a Lichtung perhaps. An openness even. A most ordinary kind of openness one experiences after having cleaned a place or re-arranged a desk, or tidied a bookcase.

#homeless thoughts

The world is saturated with non-thinking, non-thoughts, unthoughts, homeless thoughts namely those that have lost their connection, have lost their extension or more precisely lack extension. Of course epistemologically speaking this implies and we confirm this, that any kind of knowledge which is uprooted by thought must originate in the body first. There isn’t a single thought (as opposed to unthought as meant here) that does not come to us through the body or more precisely: is of the body.

If unthoughts are everywhere then, where did they come from? To answer this we should take into account the permanent state of forgetting. An unthought is characterised by having no memory. It has no memory because it constructed automatically. It is a product of automation. And never mind that automation relies on technical memories such as harddrives etc. This is not memory: it is a store, a pseudo-historical resource to be mined, a Bestand, or to be more precise a data store. Technical memory is mechanized memory with varying degrees of volatility (RAM is more volatile than ROM or a harddrive). Bodily memory is non-volatile and perhaps even permanent. Anagnosia and phantom limbs are instructive here, as Merleau-Ponty showed.

A homeless thought is the result of a procedural, surgical removal of body, or flesh, if you so prefer. Procedural because automatic, driven by standardisation, institutionalised by bureaucratisation, virtualised by informatisation etc.

#gap

Spurious reads Pessoa: My God, my God, who am I watching? How many am I? Who is I? What is this gap between me and me?

Ex-centric Positionality and être-au-monde

Let’s take up Dylan’s bio-phenomenological theme earlier. The ‘unfolding of life within life’ as he so eloquently put it. A biological perspective, or rather a zoological one to be more precise, provided by Helmuth Plessner might be of great assistance here. All the more because Plessner in the introduction to Mit Anderen Augen, Aspekte eine philosophischen Antropologie speaks of Merleau-Ponty. It is mentioned in his autobiographical preface that it has come to his attention that his readers have found many congruent ideas and thinking between himself and the great French phenomenologist from Paris. It was suggested Merleau-Ponty must in fact have read him. Whether this is the case or not is not of any real importance here (and neither was it to Plessner for that matter but as a sidenote Merleau-Ponty does mention Plessner and his Dutch ‘twin’ Buytendijk in The Phenomenology of Perception in reference to Umweltintentionalität). In any case here we are simply and quite roughly starting to crossbreed être-au-monde (Merleau-Ponty) and Exzentrische Positionalität as Plessner calls it.

Plessner’s philosophical anthropology is rooted in a spatially oriented thinking, literally, around the body of man. As a zoologist he’s is preoccupied with the difference between plants, animals and man on the one hand and the inorganic on the other. As a philosopher what has come to occupy his thought is a possible answer to the question what seperates the two realms and how the barrier between the vital and non-vital is both experienced as well as constitutive for experience or perhaps better put: being.

Between the organic and inorganic there is a rift (Bruche), a divide. Man is a creature which, within the organisation of the world and as an organisational principle itself, is able to exist on both sides of the rift at the same time both as body and soul and as an existential integrity: while he is a body and a soul he is also a psychophysische neutrale Einheit across the rift. Indeed a ‘psycho-chemical unity’ as Dylan puts it. Or perhaps we should not say across the rift but, as Plessner does, man is both diesseits and jenseits of the rift which to me simply means: man is the rift itself.

Perhaps this continuous non-continuity with oneself positionally speaking, which derives from the precognitive bodily experience of and against the world itself, constitutive of our being as rift, is best summarized by Plessner quoting Ernst Bloch: Ich bin, aber ich habe mich nicht.

To exist as rift is possible only because man has a unique position within and towards the world then, a unique positionality. With positionality Plessner means the orientation and organisation of an organic entity towards and in particular against its Umgebung, its environment. Animals are characterized in this sense by a closed positionality: an animal positions itself centrally within its environment which is to say it organises itself from the center (Mitte). It is as such a conscious being but not one that is able to exceed its own center, its own centric positionality. In short, an animal cannot disengage itself from its own centric being.

Man has an ex-centric positionality, because it is not just conscious (i.e. centric), it is self-conscious. Self-consciousness means to be able to exceed or open the limits of one centrically constituted position within and against one ‘s Umgebung. Man is able to leave his own central position to take on a view from outside the center towards itself. This is what it means to be a rift or an abyss. To be both centered and decentered at the same time. Man as an organic life form therefore is continuously engaged in what I would call a paracentric proces: while man is himself a center, he is constantly moving away and towards this center, he is continuously centering and decentring himself in varying degrees of proximity towards himself without ever being able to settle.

#revenge on my head

Spurious: Sometimes I want to pre-empt the destruction, I tell W. I want to lie my head beneath a caterpillar track. Want it to burst like a melon. Because my head aches, I tell W. My head throbs … And that’s what the machines want, I sometimes think: revenge on my head.

The Low Perspective

Returning to the methodological ‘low’ point of view briefly now. According to Merleau-Ponty this judging of man from below has only become possible in modernity. In the translator’s note of my edition of his famous radio lectures (published as Causeries/The World of Perception) we read that during the radio broadcast of the fifth lecture, Man Seen From the Outside, Merleau-Ponty changed the written, prepared text in a significant way relating to this low point of view, this viewpoint from below.

Before modernity (he’s comparing Kafka and Voltaire), he says, there was bitterness and maliciousness. The moderns have a lot more true humor. Having beared witness to the contingence of human existence and societies, the moderns, instead of relying on a superior intelligence such as the giant in Voltaire’s Micromégas, switch to another kind of intelligence, a truely alien one, to tell their stories.

So Kafka talks about some sort of beetle and elsewhere about mice. Why? Because in these stories, from the ‘below-perspective’, what Merleau-Ponty also calls the outside perspective i.e. man seen from the outside, we are still able to recognise, in a humorous way, something entirely human however alien the setting might be. To Merleau-Ponty for instance  The Trial is not about the absurdities of the law and an innocent man. Rather, it’s about a man who is willing to take on his guilt in the face of the strangeness of the law, its alien nature.

I love this method of reading Kafka which I think comes very close to actually reading Kafka. It emphasizes the humor and makes it an essential part of Kafka’s genius, his primary appeal, which is too often forgotten in interpretations that focus on just the absurdity, the dread and disquietude. And secondly and perhaps most importantly, it tells us how to read Kafka namely by simply reading what is says.

The Metamorphosis is about a beetle.

Doing-Television-Watching

Ressentiment towards capitalism fuels a consumer slave-morality based on envied deprivation which favours consumption as passivity and unreflective receptivity. Consumption however, as De Certeau rightly stipulates, is not to be unproblematically equated with passivity or to be thought of, simply and naively, as the opposite of production. It is not.

Instead he reasons, consumption is another production. Consumption is a hidden productive process itself, a hidden poiesis. The ‘consumer-sphinx’ produces practices, ways of “making-do”.

Perhaps inter-passivity can be thought of as such a practice. After all De Certeau’s basic example to illustrate consumption (both as ‘use’ as well as a kind of behavior) is the use of television which also happens to provide the paradigmatic example of inter-passive behaviour. I say ‘use’ because in De Certeau’s  opinion we are consumers or users of television which begs the question: to what end do we use or consume television?

In what way, if any, have we turned watching television into a practice in the sense that Certeau means it?

Like cooking and living in the city, watching television provides us with some sort of pleasure. There is a kind of doing-television-watching to phrase this in Certeau’s own idiom i.e. as a performative enunciation. The act of watching television, if it produces anything in our consumer-sphinx, is hidden from an external observer’s scrutiny, one of the characteristics of a practice. The television watcher also has his own set of gestures, another important part of Certeau’s ‘ways of doing’. The gestures might be simple, perhaps even stupid, requiring only ‘ordinary intelligence’, they are still heavily ritualized gestures. For instance to reach for the remote, to flip channels, are rituals in the same sense as those found in cooking (the example discussed at length in the second volume of The Practice of Everyday Life).

But perhaps the most striking parallel between De Certeau’s (or really Luce Giard’s) analysis of the practice of cooking is the idea of ‘multiple memory’. The most avid and skilled television watcher knows exactly what is happening on multiple channels at the same while he is constantly flipping between channels. It involves a kind of calculation, a sense of timing and evaluation of what is shown on multiple channels at the same time, in order to succesfully surf the channels.

On the other hand, the most striking difference between cooking and watching television is that we eat food to live while I don’t suppose anyone would say he watches television to nourish himself. But perhaps this can be remedied if we take into account the isolation one can experience when not in tune with what happened on television last night, in a particular show everyone is talking about at work, or in the train etc. In that sense the practice of watching television can be thought of essential to living.

Finally, the one thing that we can list in a defense of watching television as a practice is the idea of the practice as a kind of subversive action. The Spanish might have colonized and conquered the Indians, forcefully bequeathing upon them their religion etc. it was done on the Indians own terms as De Certeau summarizes: ‘they metamorphized the dominant order: they made it function in another register’.

In the same way, interpassivity can be thought as an act of subversion, as a kind of defensive measure against the pressures of modernity (to always be interactive, online, engaged etc). Suppose we have been colonized ourselves by a dispositif, an apparatus who’s disciplinary excercise of power is through the demand to be interactive.

Interpassively doing-television-watching i.e. having and allowing the television to enjoy in our stead, might very well be an act of rebellion in that case. A way to defend our true enjoyment, the true product of our consumption, by cunningly misleading the Big Other to believe we are in fact enjoying what s/he believes we are enjoying. By completely foregoing interactivity we elude and evade the interactive apparatus while maintaining the appearance (i.e. interpassive behaviour) at the same time.

In this way, to conclude these preliminary remarks, inter-passivity offers a way to escape the realm of ressentiment-capitalism and the naive notion of consumption as passivity which it instills i.e. the slave-morality it nurtures.

#humanity is another corporeity

Side Effects writes: Merleau-Ponty in Nature: “Before being reason, humanity is another corporeity” (208). Disquiet is the result of this thought. Why? Because human life sediments itself in the patina of arrogance, refusing to contend with its prepersonal materiality—my body, no longer me. As such, phenomenology must become bio-phenomenology as it maps this unfolding of life within life.